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Case Note: Means v. District Court of the Chinle
Judicial District and the Hadane Doctrine in
Navajo Criminal Law
Paul Spruhan1

INTRODUCTION

On December 29, 1997 Navajo Nation police arrested noted Oglala Sioux
activist and actor, Russell Means, near Chinle, Arizona after an incident involving
his father-in-law Leon Grant (a member of the Omaha tribe) and Jeremiah Bitsui, a
Navajo male.2 At the time of the incident Russell Means was married to Gloria
Grant, an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation.3 The Navajo Nation Prosecutor’s
Office subsequently charged Means with one count of “threatening” and two
counts of “battery”4 under the Navajo Nation Code.5
Before trial in the Chinle District Court of the Navajo Nation, Russell
Means moved to dismiss the charges for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 6 Relying primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Duro v.
Reina, Means contended the Navajo courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over
an Indian who was not a member of the Navajo Nation.7 Means attacked the
constitutionality of the so-called “Duro fix”8 that reaffirmed the inherent authority
of a tribe to prosecute any “Indian” by effectively overruling Duro. He asserted that
he lacked the ability to participate in the Navajo political process, as he could not
vote and could not run for office. He argued that any congressional action to
subject him to Navajo jurisdiction then violated his right to equal protection under
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. He also contended the
Navajo Nation had explicitly given up any such authority in the Treaty of 1868.9
As a jurisdictional issue, Russell Mean’s case would appear to be a matter
exclusively decided under federal law. As the jurisdiction of tribal courts has been
defined and interpreted by federal courts under federal legal principles, the main
thrust of the case centers around case law defining tribal power over three
categories of individuals: (1) “Indians” who are members of the governing tribe;
(2) “non-member Indians” who are members of another tribe; and (3) non-Indians.
Through piece-meal Supreme Court decisions and congressional acts, federal law
has shaped and restricted tribal power in the criminal sphere by utilizing these
constructed categories.10 Assuming the “Duro fix” was indeed unconstitutional,
Means’ apparent status as a non-member Indian would permit him to escape
Navajo jurisdiction.

1
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See Navajo Nation v. Means, No. CH-CR-2205/2207—97, slip op. at 1 (Chinle Dist. Ct. July 20,
1998).
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See id.
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17 NNC §§ 310(a)(1), 316 (1995).
5
See Navajo Nation v. Means, No. CH-CR-2205/2207-97, slip. op. at 1.
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See id. at 1—2.
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See id.
8
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994).
9
See Navajo Nation v. Means, No. CH-CR-2205/2207—97, slip. op. at 1.
10
See generally DAVID GETCHES, CHARLES WILKINSON, AND ROBERT WILLIAMS,
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 485—88 (4th ed. 1998).
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When the Navajo courts heard the Means case, they appealed to Navajo
common law, the indigenous Dine legal tradition, as one ground for exerting
jurisdiction over him.11 The Navajo Supreme Court asserted he was a hadane, or
in-law under Navajo law by virtue of his marriage to a Navajo woman.12 As
a hadane, Russell Means had “affiliated” himself with the Navajo Nation and,
along with his activities within the Nation, therefore consented to Navajo criminal
jurisdiction. Though by federal principles he appears to be a “non-member Indian,”
the Navajo Nation under common law derived from custom and tradition
concluded that he carried the jurisdictional attributes of a “member” Indian.13
An analysis of the Navajo Supreme Court Means opinion might be
approached in two different ways: (1) as an independent analysis of Navajo law
outside of considerations of federal notions of tribal sovereignty; or (2) as a
comparative analysis considering the probable success of the Navajo opinion vis-avis extant federal common law on tribal criminal authority.
As an examination of Navajo law on its own terms, the first type of
analysis has the attraction of fostering what might be termed “jurisprudential
sovereignty”- that is an appreciation and facilitation of the sovereign authority of a
tribe to define its own law under its own traditions and customs regardless of
outside federally imposed limitations. Such examination of Navajo law in a
vacuum in the context of this case has the disadvantage of ignoring existing
federally constructed legal reality. As a potential guide to future litigation, a case
note on a tribal case implicating federal law confronts pressure to fully define
“what the law is” as opposed to what it might be were the tribe fully free to define
its own law. Given such concerns, the second analysis has the advantage of
gauging the potential success of tribal law in a federal system, but also of
comparing two different legal systems and the cultural world-views that inform
them. However, the second approach potentially undermines and subordinates
tribal law by suggesting it is ultimately dependent on federal approval for
legitimacy.
In the end, the author decided on incorporating both approaches in this
paper. In Part I, the paper describes federal common law constructions of tribal
criminal jurisdiction, and specifically Justice Kennedy’s construction of “consent,”
as background leading to the Means decision. In Part II, the paper then considers
Navajo jurisprudence concerning the incorporation of tradition and customs of the
Dine people for criminal jurisdiction, and examines its implications for nonNavajos potentially subject to Navajo law. Through a comparative examination of
the Means opinion and the Duro case, Part III of the paper analyzes the holding,
sources, and rationale of Means and their potential compatibility with existing
federal common law. Ultimately, the paper considers the Navajo theory of
“consent” through intimate affiliation and its implications for potential non-Navajo
defendants.
As a threshold matter, the author feels it important to note that he is a nonNavajo and a non-Indian. His approach reflects not only his cultural and
11

See Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, 2 Navajo Appellate Rep. 528, 535—36,
26 ILR 6083, 6087-88, No. SC-CV-61-98 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1999).
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pedagogical background, but also his current status as a hadane, or in-law to a
Navajo family. The author notes that he does not purport to know Navajo traditions
and customs, but seeks to analyze and explain the Navajo Supreme
Court’s Means decision from the perspective of an outsider, non-Indian attorney,
and as an individual potentially subject to Navajo jurisdiction by virtue of the
Navajo Nation’s law.
With these caveats in mind, it is important to note that the Means opinion
presents a new and provocative declaration of tribal sovereignty vis-à-vis United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence. Beyond its specific facts, the Means case may
create a conflict between federal and Navajo law over classification of individuals
for criminal jurisdiction. The case also challenges the ability of tribes to fully exert
their sovereign authority to apply its own customs and traditions to questions
implicating federal law. While it appears decisions of tribal courts under tribal law
receive absolute deference in federal courts,14 the decision of the Navajo Nation
threatens to undermine the convenient federal categorization of criminal
defendants. Ultimately, the application of Navajo common law as a theory of
consent presents a provocative question to Federal Indian law: Can indigenous
customary law define an individual’s status for purposes of federal criminal
jurisdiction?
I. Development of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Under Federal Law
Since the beginning of the United States, federal laws and statutes have
divested tribal governments of full and exclusive criminal jurisdiction within their
territory. The result has been a confusing morass requiring charts and a list of racial
and political identities to discover which government has criminal
authority.15 Unlike civil jurisdiction, the status of the land within tribal territory is
immaterial.16 Instead jurisdiction between the three sovereigns (tribal, federal, and
state) is premised on the identity and tri-partite classification of individual criminal
offenders (tribal members, non-member Indians, and non-Indians).17
The General Crimes Act early on subjected “interracial” crimes between
Indians and non-Indians to concurrent federal/ tribal jurisdiction.18 Fearing the
extension of traditional notions of restorative tribal justice,19 Congress passed the
Major Crimes Act of 1885.20 The act subjected Indians within tribal territory to
14

See e.g., Hinshaw v. Mahler, 42 F.3d 1178, 1179 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The Tribal Court’s interpretation of
Tribal law is binding on this court.”); Nevada v. Hicks, 944 F.Supp. 1455, 1461 (D. Nev. 1996) (Federal
courts defer on determinations of tribal law unless they “implicate substantial federal
questions.”)(quotations added).
15
See WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 168 (3rd ed. 1998).
16
See Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
17
See CANBY, supra note 14, at 168.
18
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1994).
19
The Major Crimes Act was explicitly passed in response to the Supreme Court decision in Ex Parte
Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). There the Court held that a murder of Spotted Tail, a Sioux chief, by
another Sioux Indian was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe. The tribe imposed restitution,
creating outrage among government officials who considered the punishment too lenient. See
generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY,
TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 100—41 (1994).
20
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
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federal jurisdiction for a number of enumerated crimes commonly prosecuted as
felonies. 21 In United States v. McBratney 22 and Draper v. United States 23 the
Supreme Court held that crimes between non-Indians were subject to state
government prosecution.
However, the most significant divestment of tribal power resulted from
two recent Supreme Court decisions, Oliphant v. Suquamish24 and Duro v. Reina25.
In Oliphant the United States Supreme Court ruled as a matter of federal common
law that Indian tribes lacked any inherent authority to prosecute “non-Indians” who
commit crimes within their territory. 26 Appealing to a purported lack of
congressional and executive recognition of tribal power, the Court held that under
federal common law such jurisdiction was “inconsistent with their dependent
status.”27
A. Duro v. Reina and Non-Member Criminal Jurisdiction
In Duro v. Reina, the Court ruled that Indian tribes also lacked criminal
jurisdiction over non-member Indians like Russell Means.28 Justice Kennedy’s
opinion most fully articulated the Court’s view of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers who are citizens of the United States:
… criminal trial and punishment is so serious an intrusion on
personal liberty that its exercise over non-Indian citizens was a
power necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission
to the overriding sovereignty of the United States. We hesitate
to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out
another group of citizens, nonmember Indians, for trial by
political bodies that do not include them.29
By appealing to theories of civil “inclusion” the Supreme Court applied
Anglo-American political theory to demarcate the extent of tribal jurisdiction. In
his opinion Justice Kennedy articulated and imposed a constitutional theory of
tribal authority, asserting the origin of such power derives from “consent of its
members.” 30 Kennedy concluded that federal jurisprudence has accepted tribal
criminal authority over tribal members due to “the voluntary character of tribal
membership and the concomitant right of participation in a tribal government, the
authority of which rests on consent.”31 In the end, Kennedy asserted that “[t]he
retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain additional authority
the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal members.”32

21

Id.
104 U.S. 621 (1881).
164 U.S. 240 (1896).
24
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
25
495 U.S. 676 (1990).
26
Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211.
27
Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
28
Id. at 211.
29
Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 694.
32
Id. at 693.
22
23
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Importantly, Kennedy expressed clear discomfort with Indian tribunals
that decide matters based on traditional law or custom. He explicitly noted that
“[w]hile modern tribal courts include many familiar features of the judicial process,
they are influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the tribes they
serve.”33 He also alleged that tribal courts are “often” subordinate to “the political
branches of tribal governments” with legal methods “possibly” depending on
“unspoken practices and norms,” quoting the usually indisputable Cohen Handbook
of Federal Indian Law.34
Tribal courts then appear to Kennedy to be the antithesis of the federal
judicial system and its purported uniformity and political independence. The
sovereign authority to apply its own traditional laws appears to justify federal
common law divestment of tribal authority over anyone deemed unfamiliar by
virtue of their non-membership in the host tribe. Kennedy’s palatable discomfort
with tribal court jurisdiction over anyone not a voluntary member of that tribal
community reflects his distrust of a tribe’s ability to be “fair” free of direct
constitutional restrictions.
One root of this discomfort appears to be previous Supreme Court
precedent, especially Talton v. Mayes,35 which established that tribal governments
are not subject to the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. Kennedy reminded the reader
that while the Indian Civil Rights Act36 provides “some statutory guarantees of fair
procedure,” they are not equivalent to “their constitutional counterparts.”37 Without
directly stating so, Kennedy suggested that any federal affirmation of tribal power
over non-members would constitute an unconstitutional delegation to a
fundamentally unfair judicial system. 38 Under Kennedy’s theory, tribal
governments, as extra-constitutional tribunals can only be trusted to prosecute
those who can theoretically “participate” in the government. The end result
of Duro is the de facto absorption of tribal governments into the constitutional
framework without explicitly overruling Talton.
B. Duro and a Federal Theory of Consent
Importantly, Justice Kennedy does suggest that those who were not born
biological members of a tribe could theoretically “consent” to tribal
jurisdiction.39 However, Kennedy suggests that for such “consent” to be effective
under federal law the “consent” must include the “concomitant right of
participation” in the political process of the tribe.40 In his discussion, Kennedy cites

33

Id.
Duro, 495 U.S. at 693 (citing FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 333—
334 (1982 ed.)).
35
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
36
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
37
Duro, 495 U.S. at 693.
38
Id. at 693—94 (bolstering his argument Kennedy cited an earlier case involving military courts and a
civilian wife: “Our cases suggest constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to subject
American citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional
protections as a matter of right.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)).
39
Duro, 495 U.S. at 694.
40
See id.
34
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to United States v. Rogers,41 a case involving a white citizen of the Cherokee
Nation adopted under codified procedure through his marriage to a Cherokee
woman. In Rogers, the defendant argued the United States lacked jurisdiction over
his murder of another Cherokee adoptee under an exception for Indian-Indian
crimes in the General Crimes Act.42 Rogers essentially argued both he and the
victim were “Indian” under the statutory language. The court rejected his
contention, holding a white man adopted by a tribe could not escape federal
criminal authority by affiliating himself with Indians.43 However, the Court did
recognize that a non-Indian adoptee could “become entitled to certain privileges in
the tribe, and make himself amenable to their laws and usages.”44 The implication
of the last sentence is unclear, but could suggest concurrent federal/tribal criminal
jurisdiction over individuals who “voluntarily” join an Indian tribe. What
constitutes “voluntary” affiliation or political participation is unclear.
As Kennedy’s discussion is properly dicta it is difficult to predict how a
future court would interpret these references. However, it is somewhat clear that
mere marriage to an Indian and residence on the reservation would be insufficient
to indicate “consent.”45 In holding that Indian nations lack criminal jurisdiction
over non-member Indians, the Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
the Duro case. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit held that Duro, the alleged offender,
was subject to the jurisdiction of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa government
because of his “contacts” with the tribe. 46 Specifically, Duro was considered
“closely associated” with the community by virtue of living with his member
girlfriend and her family on the Salt River reservation and his employment with a
tribal construction company.47 The court’s conclusion appears exclusively based on
principles of “contacts,” with no indication that the Pima-Maricopa community
would or would not have considered him a “member” under their traditional laws.
The United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
“contacts” analysis, contending the rationale would “apply to non-Indians on the
reservation as readily as to Indian nonmembers.”48 Significantly, Kennedy noted
that “[m]any non-Indians reside on reservations and have close ties to tribes
through marriage or long employment.” 49 Ultimately Kennedy considered the
“contacts” test to be “little more than a variation of the argument that any person
who enters an Indian community should be deemed to have given implied consent
to tribal criminal jurisdiction over him.”50
C. The “Duro Fix” and Non-Member Criminal Jurisdiction

41

4 How. 567 (1846).
Id. at 569.
43
Id. at 572.
44
Id. (emphasis added).
45
See Duro, 495 U.S. at 695-96.
46
Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1988).
47
Id.
48
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 695 (1990).
49
Id.
50
Id.
42
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After the Duro decision Congress subsequently reaffirmed the inherent
sovereign authority to prosecute non-member Indians through passage of the socalled “Duro fix”- a 1991 amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act.51 The plain
language of the Duro fix effectively overrules the Supreme Court’s decision
in Duro by reaffirming the inherent sovereignty of tribes to prosecute “Indians”
who fit within the meaning of that term in the Major Crimes Act.52 Interestingly
Congress chose not to recognize any inherent authority to prosecute non-Indians to
overrule Oliphant. The end result is inherent tribal misdemeanor jurisdiction over
tribal members and Indians who are members of other tribes, but no jurisdiction
over non-Indians.
II. The Means Decision and Navajo Nation Development of Hadane as Consent
to Jurisdiction
In motions before the Chinle District Court of the Navajo Nation, Means
argued for dismissal on several grounds under federal law.53 He mainly argued that
the “Duro fix” was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 54 He alleged that Morton v.
Mancari55 and United States v. Antelope56 did not apply, as Congress’ use of the
category of non-member Indian constituted a “racial” as opposed to “political”
distinction. 57 He also argued that the Duro fix violated legislative/ judicial
separation of powers, as Congress purported to overrule the Supreme Court on an
issue of constitutional law, usurping the authority of the Court as the ultimate
arbiter of the Constitution. 58 In addition, he contended that the 1868 Treaty
between the Navajo Nation and the United States59 explicitly divested Navajo from
prosecuting “bad men” who were non-member Indians.60
A. The Hadane Doctrine

51

25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994).
Id. § 1301(4).
53
See Navajo Nation v. Means, No. CH-CR-2205/ 2207-97, slip op. at 1—2 (Chinle Dist. Ct. July 20,
1998).
54
See Transcript of Navajo Nation v. Means Proceedings 32 (April 14, 1998) (on file with the Chinle
District Court) [hereinafter Transcript].
55
417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding Indian employment preference was a political not a racial
classification).
56
430 U.S. 641 (1977) (holding Major Crimes Act applied a political and not a racial classification).
57
See Transcript, supra note 53 at 33.
58
See id. at 37—38. The Ninth Circuit has recently held that Congress indeed reaffirmed the inherent
sovereignty of the tribe and did not delegate the authority to prosecute non-member Indians. See United
States v. Enas, 204 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2000). The case concerned a double jeopardy claim that both the
White Mountain Apache Tribe and the United State could not prosecute a non-member Indian for
actions on the reservation. However, the question of whether the “Duro fix” violates the equal
protection clause was not at issue in the case. As Russell Means’ federal case has been filed in Arizona,
within the ninth circuit, it appears that portion of his argument has been answered.
59
Treaty with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, U.S.-Navajo, 15 Stat. 667.
60
See Transcript, supra note 53 at 38.
52
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After a hearing, the Chinle District Court denied Means’ Motion to
Dismiss.61 Addressing Means’ main arguments, Judge Gilmore held the “Duro fix”
did not violate equal protection and the Treaty did not divest the Nation of
jurisdiction.62 However, more significant for our purposes, the court also held
under Navajo common law that Russell Means’ “contacts” with the Navajo Nation
justified criminal jurisdiction over him.63 Specifically, the court held that a nonmember who affiliates himself with a Navajo is “admitted to the Navajo Nation as
an in-law to the Navajos,” and, having “assumed tribal relations with the Navajo
Nation” was subject to the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction.64 Importantly, such power
was inherent due to Means’ in-law status, and not derived from or dependent upon
federal legislation. The authority to prosecute Means derived from a wholly
different source (i.e. consent) than any reaffirmation in the “Duro fix.” Should a
federal court declare that the “Duro fix” was indeed unconstitutional and nonmember Indians were free of tribal jurisdiction, Navajo jurisdiction over in-laws as
supported by Navajo common law might then survive.
The Navajo Nation Supreme Court further articulated this Navajo theory
of consent when Russell Means sought a writ of prohibition against the Chinle
court to prevent it from continuing to hear the case. In Means v. District Court of
the Chinle Judicial District _the Navajo Supreme Court affirmed the district court,
concluding that Means had consented to jurisdiction through his marriage and
activities within the Navajo Nation. 65 The Court, per Justice Yazzie, noted that
while a formal enrollment procedure existed for Navajo membership, there existed
other kinds of “membership” under Navajo law.66 The Court described Means’
status under Navajo common law as hadane, or a Navajo in-law. 67 The Court
described the responsibilities of an in-law, stating that a hadane
assumes a clan relation to a Navajo when an intimate relationship
forms, and when that relationship is conducted within the Navajo
Nation, there are reciprocal obligations to and from family and
clan members under Navajo common law. Among those
obligations is the duty to avoid threatening or assaulting a relative
by marriage (or any other person).68
In support of the Supreme Court’s conclusion, Justice Yazzie noted that
the origin of several of the Navajo clans derived from the intermarriage
of hadane with Navajos.69 Citing a dual-language dictionary,70 Yazzie noted such
“foreign nation” clans as the “Ute people clan,” the “Zuni clan,” and the “Mexican

61

See Navajo Nation v. Means, No. CH-CR-2205/ 2207-97 (Chinle Dist. Ct. July 20, 1998).
Id. at 2-5, 8.
Id. at 6.
64
Id.
65
See Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, 2 Navajo Appellate Rep. 528, 535,
26 ILR 6083, 6087, No. SC-CV-61-98 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1999).
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
MARTHA A. AUSTIN, SAAD AHAAH SINIL: DUAL LANGUAGE (Martha A. Austin ed., Navajo
Curriculum Center Press 1974).
62
63
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clan.” 71 Though not directly stated, Yazzie infers that hadane clanspeople
historically submitted themselves to the authority of their local Dine headmen, and
by implication, to the authority of the modern Navajo Nation. As now part of the
Navajo Nation, hadane subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the centralized
Navajo tribal government. Therefore, even though Russell Means was not
“adopted” in a formal sense, his affiliation similarly constituted consent to the
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.72
Taken as a definitive statement of Navajo criminal law, the case presents
some unanswered practical questions for future prosecutions. It would appear the
criminal prosecution of non-member Indians and non-Indians within the Navajo
Nation under the hadane theory necessarily creates new and difficult threshold
evidentiary issues. Is mere cohabitation without marriage sufficient to establish the
necessary clan obligation? Is casual sexual contact without evidence of a more
serious relationship enough? Must the couple live together? Must the couple live
within Navajo Nation territory or is mere presence without residency sufficient?
How is affiliation or non-affiliation with a Navajo to be proven? Does the potential
defendant possess the burden of proof to show he or she indeed is not involved
with a Navajo? Is there a need for proof that a non-Navajo defendant actually
maintains a relationship with his or her Navajo partner’s clan relatives?
The articulation of a theory of jurisdiction based on the traditional law of
familial ties presents a provocative challenge to federal notions of membership and
classification. As Russell Means is an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux, he
already possesses the status of non-member Indian. However, if the Navajo Nation
Supreme Court theory of jurisdiction is upheld under federal law, even those
Indians enrolled in other tribes can theoretically be considered “members”
dependent on Navajo law. Perhaps even more significant, the hadane theory of
consent would appear to apply to non-Indians, implicating not
only Duro but Oliphant as well. Though not specifically at issue in this case, nonIndians married or even intimately involved with Navajos would appear to also be
subject to criminal jurisdiction as hadane under the court’s reasoning.
Where Duro would have allowed a non-Indian married to a Navajo to
escape tribal jurisdiction, the Means opinion attaches legal jurisdiction as a
condition of intimate relations. Indeed, those who choose to affiliate themselves
with Navajos face criminal jurisdiction while those who merely live and work on
the reservation do not. Choosing a partner on the reservation dependent upon his or
her Navajo status could alter the personal choices of non-Navajos and perhaps chill
Navajo-non-Navajo contact. While perhaps unlikely, the Means opinion may have
the effect of altering the social interaction of Navajos and non-Navajos, assuming
future hadane object to the criminal jurisdiction of the Nation applying to them.
However, outside the rarified world of federal Indian law, the Navajo
Supreme Court’s decision may appear somewhat unremarkable. As a practical
matter, only the peculiarities of federal common law notions of tribal sovereignty
expressed in Duro, and, to a lesser extent, Oliphant, suggest this is an anomalous
outcome. For any other sovereign in the American system, mere presence within
71

Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, 2 Navajo Appellate Rep. at 535, 26 ILR at
6087.
72
Id.
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that sovereign’s territory suffices to establish responsibility to its laws. Jurisdiction
over those who choose to enter into the social structure of that society through
romantic affiliation then could appear clearly appropriate. Even beyond the Navajo
traditional notion of hadane, general fairness (in subjectively non-Navajo terms)
may dictate that those who enter into a particular social structure and cultural
worldview with their eyes open should not be heard to complain that that society
possessed no ability to control their conduct.
B. Navajo Interpretation of Federal Case Law
Established federal law presents some perhaps-unwarranted comfort for
non-members (especially non-Indians) who possess the very real ability to flout the
laws of the government of a people he or she has willingly affiliated with through
its members within its territory. As a policy matter, federal common law protection
of non-Navajos who willingly enter the reservation and, more importantly,
willingly affiliate themselves with members of that society breeds contempt for
Navajo Nation authority. While perhaps unlikely, the very inability of the Nation to
prosecute non-Navajos in a Duro/Oliphant universe may inspire criminal acts
within the Nation’s territory.
Aware that the Navajo common law theory of consent is ultimately
dependent on federal law, the Court justified its conclusion by referencing the
“consent” discussion in Duro.73 Additionally, the Court cited several older United
States Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Rogers, 74 Nofire v. United
States,75 and In re Mayfield76 as federal precedent supportive of the Navajo theory
of consent. All three cases involve federal jurisdiction over whites adopted into the
Cherokee Nation.
In Nofire two full-blood Cherokee defendants alleged the federal court
lacked criminal jurisdiction over them.77 They were charged with murdering a
white man adopted into the Cherokee Nation through marriage to a Cherokee
woman. 78 Like Rogers they argued the victim in this case was an adopted
Cherokee. However, in 1866 the Cherokee Nation signed a treaty with the United
States, which under Article XIII explicitly reserved exclusive criminal and civil
jurisdiction over “members of the Nation, by nativity or adoption” in the Cherokee
Nation.79 The provision appears to effectively nullify the result in Rogers for the
Cherokee Nation, and allow criminal jurisdiction over those biologically nonIndian that consented to citizenship through marriage.
Importantly, the Court noted that the Cherokee Constitution explicitly
included such white men in its definition of “citizen” of the Nation.80 Apparently
such men became citizens merely by virtue of their marriage to Cherokee women

73

Id. at 534.
4 How. 567 (1846).
164 U.S. 657 (1897).
76
141 U.S. 107, 11 S. Ct. 885 (1891).
77
Nofire, 164 U.S. at 657-58.
78
See id.
79
Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee, 14 Stat. 799, 803 (emphasis added).
80
Nofire, 164 U.S. at 658.
74
75
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and residence within the Nation.81 To become a citizen, any white man seeking to
be married had to acquire a license from a Cherokee district clerk.82 Interestingly,
to obtain a license, the white man had to present a “certificate of good moral
character” to the clerk signed by at least 10 “respectable citizens” of the
Nation.83 In addition, the white man had to take an oath of allegiance to the
Nation.84 The Court then looked to tribal law to discern the victim’s status under
federal law.
The Nofire court built upon another Cherokee case, Alberty v. United
States.85 In that case a black citizen of the Cherokee Nation stood trial for the
murder of a mixed Choctaw-black man who had been married to a Cherokee
woman.86 The Supreme Court looked to the status of the victim under Cherokee
law to decide whether he was a citizen of the Nation.87 According to the Court, a
black man marrying a Cherokee woman would not thereby become a citizen of the
Nation, as marriage only allowed him to live in the Nation and hold
property.88 Significantly, the Court noted that he could not have voted in Cherokee
elections.89 The Court concluded that he carried the status of a “colored citizen of
the United States.”90
The potential effect of these cases on Means is unclear. On the one hand,
the existence of a treaty and statute explicitly recognizing exclusive jurisdiction
over adopted citizens may distinguish them from Means. However, the Supreme
Court’s examination of Cherokee law as controlling over the status of the nonIndians as nonetheless citizens of the Nation suggests the Court should defer to the
Navajo conclusion that Means is indeed a “member” for jurisdictional purposes.
Though the Cherokee law appears in Nofire as codified in their constitution and
written code, the Court quotes no such provision concerning blacks in Alberty.
Ultimately, these cases might be read against the backdrop of their discussion in
Kennedy’s Duro opinion. They appear to represent examples of consent, but should
not be looked upon as defining the exact parameters of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians, or in this case, non-member Indian citizens.
III. Hadane and Kennedy’s Theory of Consent
Given the subordination of tribal law when federal jurisdiction is at issue,
the main question is: Can Navajo common law theories of consent fit within
Kennedy’s narrow conception of voluntary submission? Lacking the ability to exert
jurisdiction by mere presence within the Navajo Nation, federal law obliges the
Navajo courts to articulate a more significant demonstration of consent, though not
necessarily precisely in line with Nofire or Alberty. Under Kennedy’s construction,
81
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two elements appear to be required: (1.) voluntary affiliation and (2.) the right to
participate in the political process of the tribe.
But what constitutes voluntary affiliation? The Means case is problematic
as, unlike Rogers and Nofire, Means is contesting tribal jurisdiction by denying his
consent instead of admitting consent to contest federal jurisdiction. Indeed the
“consent” in this case constitutes a kind of consent by adhesion, as the one who
supposedly gave consent challenges that very conclusion. No reported federal case
appears to recognize consent when the defendant himself has not argued it. Also,
unlike the individuals in the Cherokee cases, no provision of the Navajo Code sets
up a procedure by which non-Navajos could be recognized as “members” or
“adopted citizens” of the Nation. Indeed the Code states flatly that no non-Navajo
could ever be adopted into the Nation.91
Under a federal theory of voluntary affiliation the main question might be:
Can voluntary entrance into the familial and clan system of a tribe constitute
sufficient “consent”? Consent may very well depend on the extent of notice to an
in-law of the potential ramifications of entering into familial obligations with a
Navajo person on the reservation. Such notice may indeed be considered implied
consent. One potential issue is then whether Russell Means was aware of his status
as a hadane and was or should have been on notice of the tribe’s criminal
jurisdiction by virtue of his marriage. At an oral hearing on the motions to dismiss,
Means’ attorney, John Trebon, put Means on the stand to establish several facts in
support of the motions.92 On cross-examination Navajo prosecutor Donovan Brown
inquired into Russell Means’ knowledge of Navajo custom involving marriage.
Specifically he asked Means whether he was familiar with the Navajo concept of
“chardoney” [sic]. 93 Means claimed not to have any knowledge. Brown then
translated “hadane” and asked whether he was aware of the importance of the “inlaw”. Means again stated he had no knowledge.94 If Means is to be believed,
Means’ consent could only be unconscious- that is without specific knowledge of
his status in the community under traditional Navajo principles.
Even assuming he knew of his hadane status, prior to the incident in
question, Navajo courts had not applied traditional or customary law to a nonmember for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. However, the Navajo Supreme Court
strongly suggested it would so hold if such a situation arose. In Navajo Nation v.
Platero95 the Court held that it would construe the Navajo Nation Criminal Code in
light of Navajo common law. Indeed in Platero, the Court applied traditional
notions of leadership to hold that a Navajo police officer could not be convicted of
battery unless he knew he did not have the right to act as a police officer.96
In Navajo Nation v. Hunter97 the Court suggested in dicta that a nonNavajo may “assume tribal relations” and would be considered a statutory “Indian”
under the Navajo Criminal Code. The Court asserted that “marriage or
cohabitation” with a Navajo was one method of tribal affiliation constituting
91

1 NNC § 702 (1995).
See Transcript, supra note 53 at 23.
93
See id.
94
See id.
95
Navajo L. Rep. Supp. 278, 280, 19 ILR 6049, 6050, No. A-CR-04-91 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1991).
96
See id.
97
Navajo L. Rep. Supp. 429, 431 (Nav. Sup. Ct. 1996).
92

8/15/18 1:53 AM

13

Tribal Law Journal

Vol. 1

consent to jurisdiction. 98 Importantly, such individuals could be non-member
Indians or non-Indians; either could be affiliated and therefore subject to such
jurisdiction. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court suggested this despite the Navajo
Code provision explicitly forbidding adoption of non-Navajos into the
Nation.99 The Hunter case predated the Means incident.
Therefore, Russell Means was theoretically “on notice” that affiliation
with a Navajo could possibly subject him to Navajo criminal jurisdiction. Specific
knowledge of the Navajo conception of hadane was not necessary, as Hunter
premised its conclusion on affiliation through marriage or cohabitation. He
arguably should have known that Navajo law considered his marriage to be implied
consent to jurisdiction.
A. Consent and Navajo Common Law
Assessing the Means case under federal notions of voluntary submission
may be further complicated due to the nature and development of Navajo common
law. This may be especially true given Justice Kennedy’s expression of discomfort
with applications of custom and “unwritten usages” to non-members. Though
certain Navajo traditions are codified in statutory law, the application of custom
comes almost exclusively through common law precedent. The Navajo court
system presents a fascinating example of an Anglo-American style judiciary reinfusing its choice of law principles with the application of unwritten pre-existing
customs and traditions. Former Chief Judge Tom Tso referred to the application of
such traditional principles as Navajo common law, emphasizing that Navajo
tradition is indeed law in the Navajo Nation.100
The Judicial Reform Act of 1985 declares that Navajo courts shall apply
Navajo common law in all cases not prohibited by federal law.101 Through AngloAmerican style precedent, the former Navajo Court of Appeals, and now the
Navajo Supreme Court has articulated and developed its own indigenous form of
common law jurisprudence by incorporating customs and traditions pre-dating the
formation of the modern Navajo government. Analogizing Navajo common law
with English principles of “custom”102, groundbreaking Justices Tso and Yazzie
have constructed a judicial mechanism to apply traditional Navajo notions of
harmony and unity to modern legal issues.103 The United States Supreme Court
recognized the use of Navajo traditional principles in United States v.
Wheeler.104 However, Wheeler also began the explicit use of the term “member” to
describe the extent of tribal jurisdiction.105
One of the difficult issues for non-traditional Navajos and non-Navajos
appears to be locating sources and correctly applying traditional principles to their
specific cases. Indeed the custom and traditions applied as law come primarily
98
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from unwritten sources and may reflect local or familial ways not broadly
applicable to a greater Navajo context. As the former Court of Appeals articulated
in Lente v. Notah:
The danger in using Navajo custom and tradition lies in
attempting to apply customary principles without understanding
their application to a given situation. Navajo custom varies from
place to place throughout the Navajo Nation; old customs and
practices may be followed by the individuals involved in the case
or not; there may be a dispute as to what the custom is and how it
is applied; or, a tradition of the Navajo may have fallen so out of
use that it cannot any longer be considered a “custom”.106
The Navajo courts have then indicated that even if discoverable, not all
customs and traditions will automatically be incorporated into a modern Navajo
jurisprudence. Indeed, local customs may not be applicable and customs not
generally followed may also fall out of usage. Discovering which traditions still
exist and how pervasive their applications are may present great difficulty for
outsiders potentially subject to Navajo law. Such considerations may affect a nonNavajo court’s view of consent through custom.
How do persons not cognizant of traditional Navajo law present their
arguments for or against its use? Aware of this issue, the Navajo courts have
developed guidelines for discovering and implementing Navajo customs and
judicial procedure by which to bring them before the court. A litigant may
demonstrate the common law principle to be applied through recorded Navajo
court opinions, learned treatises on the Navajo way, judicial notice, or the
testimony of expert witnesses who have substantial knowledge of Navajo common
law.107 When custom is presented in one of these ways it appears the ultimate
decision to apply them to the facts of the specific case lies in the district court
judge’s discretion. If traditional law is not argued at the district court level, it
appears the ability to do so before the Navajo Supreme Court has been waived.108
Judicial notice of Navajo common law is appropriate “where no question
arises regarding custom or usage… if a custom is generally known within the
community, or if it is capable of accurate determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, it is proven.”109 If a district court takes
judicial notice of a particular custom as Navajo common law, the court is required
to clearly indicate the custom upon which it relied.110 Clear references facilitate
examination of an order by the Supreme Court.111
If expert witnesses are required, the courts have developed a unique
procedure under the laws of evidence. In cases where Navajo custom is disputed
the trial court is to hold a pre-trial conference with two or three expert witnesses
appointed by the court.112 The parties to the litigation may only ask clarification
106
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questions.113 The experts can discuss how a particular Navajo custom should be
applied in the case, and should reach a consensus on the issue.114 The trial court
then has discretion to allow the testimony of an expert on the relevant
custom.115 Similar to the federal rules of evidence, to qualify an expert the trial
judge must be satisfied that an individual is in indeed an expert on Navajo common
law. An expert may be qualified through reading or practice, through “familiarity
with Navajo traditions acquired by oral education, or his adherence to a traditional
way of life, or through his long-term interest in deepening his knowledge of Navajo
custom, or through his status within the community as a person with a special
knowledge of custom.”116
The Lente case presents another relevant consideration to Means: How do
Navajo courts evaluate the applicability of uniquely Navajo customs to cases
involving non-Navajo litigants? In Lente, a Comanche mother sought custody of
her child by a Navajo father.117 As part of her argument she appealed to Navajo
traditional law on matrilineal descent.118 The Court faced the question of whether to
apply Navajo custom that children live with the mother.119 The Court concluded
that
[t]he solution to this problem lies in the courtroom. Whether the
parties expect tradition will be applied will come out in
testimony, and the Navajo Tribal Council has very wisely
provided that judges may take care of any doubts they have in
using custom and tradition by requesting the advice of
‘counsellors’… on the matter.120
The question appears even more complicated when one of the litigants is
the Navajo government seeking to justify its exertion of jurisdiction over a nonNavajo. Indeed Russell Means appears not to have argued Navajo common law at
all, relying almost exclusively on the unconstitutionality of the Duro fix along with
the Treaty of 1868. However, the Navajo Prosecutor’s Office appears to have
argued for the application of traditional familial principles of reciprocal obligations
regardless of whether Means had knowledge of them or experience with them.
The hadane theory of consent in Navajo jurisprudence appears to have
been developed primarily through judicial notice and the court’s reading
of Duro and Oliphant. Indeed, in Navajo Nation v. Hunter, the Supreme Court
appears to primarily rely on Kennedy’s citations to U.S. v. Rogers and Nofire v.
United States.121 However, Judge Gilmore cites no federal cases in support of his
theory of in-law consent, and therefore appears to have taken judicial notice of the
existence of the in-law relationship and its application to Navajo government
prosecutorial authority. The Supreme Court in Means appears to have combined the
two, along with referencing a learned treatise. As in his opinion in Hunter, Justice
113
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Yazzie asserts consistency with Kennedy’s Duro opinion. 122 However, his
discussion of hadane cites no external authority in support and therefore appears to
originate through judicial notice. He did bolster his discussion with reference to the
dual language dictionary when discussing the relation of previous hadane to the
Navajo clan system.123
B. Political Participation
The other prong of Kennedy’s requirement for consent, the right of
political participation, is also problematic. Indeed Russell Means’ primary
complaint about potential Navajo jurisdiction appears to be that he lacks the ability
to vote or run for office in the Navajo Nation.124 Also, though a hadane, Means
asserts he was denied the opportunity to get a job on the reservation or start a
business due to his outsider status as a non-member Indian. 125 If a kind of
“member” of the Navajo Nation, Means indeed is a member with fewer rights than
those officially enrolled under the Navajo Code. Though he is protected by both the
Indian Civil Rights Act126 and the Navajo’s own Bill of Rights,127 he lacks equal
ability to participate in official elections as a voter or a candidate.
However, his status as a hadane appears to have allowed him the
opportunity to participate in Navajo political discussions in other ways. In crossexamination during the Chinle hearing, Means did state he attended local Chapter
meetings.128 Assisted by an interpreter, he followed the discussions though held in
the Navajo language.129 However, when asked why he didn’t attempt to participate
he stated that as a guest he didn’t impose himself.130 He also had involved himself
in Navajo politics during the Peter McDonald controversy, leading a march in
Window Rock concerning McDonald’s removal.131
In the end, the meaning of the sparse language in Duro regarding political
participation is unclear. However, given Kennedy’s emphasis on constitutional
principles of authority being derived from “consent of the governed” the ability to
vote may very well be essential. Therefore, Mean’s inability to vote in tribal
elections may very well defeat Navajo jurisdiction under their theory of consent,
even if his status as a hadane constitutes “consent” to membership in the
community. His participation in Navajo politics and his ability to attend Navajo
meetings appears insufficient under Kennedy’s theory of citizenship.

IV. Conclusion
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The Means case represents a clash between two legal cultures with
differing sources of law and differing beliefs in the origin of prosecutorial power.
The Navajo Supreme Court has premised criminal jurisdiction on familial
affiliation. The obligations owed in-laws under Navajo custom justify criminal
jurisdiction of the central political authority in the Navajo Nation. Justice Kennedy
of the United States Supreme Court premises such authority on voluntary
submission and the “right to participate” in the political processes of the centralized
authority.
For those that favor an extension of tribal sovereignty to its widest extent
within its territory, the use of custom represents a bold and noteworthy step
towards that goal. For those who favor the revival or at least greater utilization of
indigenous law derived from a tribe’s customs and traditions, the use
of hadane represents a strong expression of perhaps true jurisprudential
sovereignty. Not only do tribes possess the authority to implement their own laws,
but tribes also have the power to define the origin, sources, and application of their
indigenous laws to the modern context.
However, for those who reject the authority of government not based on
Anglo-American political notions of “consent of the governed,” the Means case
represents the potential for a shocking abuse of power. Under the present political
organization of the Navajo Nation, Means cannot vote, cannot run for election, and
has no ability to alter it. For those dedicated to the protection of individual rights
under the constitution against any government “within ” the United States, the
Navajo Nation’s assertion of jurisdiction represents the antithesis of legitimate
authority.
After the Navajo Supreme Court rejected his request for a writ of
prohibition, Russell Means filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Arizona.132 Such a writ allows a federal action
under the protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act.133 There, the federal court will
have direct authority to revisit the issue of consent if argued before it.
Only the dominance of federal law in questions of criminal jurisdiction
within Indian Country allows second-guessing of the Navajo Nation in
the Means case. As a matter of sovereignty, tribal courts should have the authority
to decide important questions under their own laws based on their own customs.
However, when non-members are involved, the fear of unfettered “extraconstitutional” power of tribal courts non-Indian judges do not accept may
eventually compel reversal. No matter how sophisticated a structure a tribe may
implement to establish clear guidelines for the use of custom, the very application
of that custom to those not born and bred within them appears to worry the federal
judiciary. It may then be that the jurisprudential sovereignty of Indian tribes may
survive, but only in those cases that do not implicate federal law.
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